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Creating a person imposes the risks of life on that person.  Life can be pretty awful, as we all know, but it can also be pretty great (so they say).  When we create a person, we create a subject of interests – a person for whom things can go more or less well; a person who can experience benefits or burdens.  Life is a risk for that person, as it is for all of us, and creating a person imposes the risks of life upon her, just as our parents imposed the risks of life upon us.  Once we recognize procreation as a risk imposing act, we have a way to assess the moral permissibility of the act and a way to think about how many children we should have.  I suggest we assess creating a person in the way we assess any act of risk imposition.  Generally speaking, we assess risk imposing acts by evaluating the impact that allowing or banning the act in question would have on the interests of the people that would be most impacted by the act.
	In order to have a semblance of a life, we have to allow some risk imposition because there's almost nothing that we do that doesn't impose some degree of risk on other people.  Even breathing exposes other people to our germs.  They might get sick!  But, what are we supposed to do?  Stop breathing?  Insist that everyone wear surgical masks at all times?  That seems too burdensome for the nature and degree of risk we're talking about here.  If we were visiting an immune compromised person in the hospital, we would likely assess the situation differently.  We'd put on the mask.  If we found ourselves in the midst of a virulent global flu pandemic, we might reach for the masks again.  We don't wear surgical masks all the time because we think that our interests in breathing, eating, and communicating freely are stronger than the interest we have in not being exposed to garden variety pathogens.  When considering the act of breathing with or without a surgical mask, we consider how burdensome it would be wear a surgical mask almost all the time compared to how burdensome it is to occasionally get sick from exposure to someone else's infectious exhalation.
	We can think of creating a person, using similar reasoning, by considering how burdensome it would be for the people who want to have children to restrain themselves from doing so compared to how burdensome it would be for those children to be born and live through their lives.  This is likely to be a far more complex set of considerations than the simpler case of whether the risk of getting a cold merits a demand for surgical masks as everyday attire.  Thinking of procreation as a risk imposition is not likely to lead us to the same conclusion in each case of procreation because the risks of life differ for different people depending on the circumstances of their birth and the cost of not procreating differ for different people depending on a wide variety of factors, including whether they have alternate ways to comparable fulfillment and whether they have children already.  (Note that never being created is of no cost to anyone because there is no one who bears that cost).
	Some people are at high risk for poverty, ill health, criminality, and misery; others are at lower risk for these unfortunate outcomes and have a higher probability of flourishing.  Some people have a mild interest in having children while others have a much stronger interest.  For some people, the impact of procreation on their well-being is stronger than it might be for others (based on a wide variety of factors about the person's life circumstances and life prospects).  The sets of interests at play in procreative cases differ depending on the people involved and the likelihood of various outcomes occurring in their lives.  That's why how many children one should have depends.  It depends on the nature, extent and strength of your (rational) interest in having a child and it depends on the kind of life your child is likely to have.
	In my book, The Risk of A Lifetime: How, When, and Why Procreation May Be Permissible, I argue for assessing each case of possible procreation with a principle formulated to take the interests of prospective parents and future children into appropriate account.  I call the principle "Procreative Balance," and it tells us that procreation is permissible when the risk you impose as a procreator on your children is a risk that it would not be irrational for you to accept as a condition of your own birth, in exchange for the permission to procreate in this particular case.  So, for example, if you are thinking about having a child when you are a forty-five year old woman, you have to think about whether it would be rational to accept the risks associated with being born to a forty-five year old mother (including, for example, a fairly high risk of having Down syndrome) for the sake of being morally permitted to have a baby at forty-five.  This principle allows us to compare the impact that allowing or not allowing the risk-imposing act in question might have on interests of the prospective parent and the future child.  We can then consider whether we think the risk imposition is acceptable.  But our answer is unlikely to be the same in all cases because the ways in which the procreative act is likely to impact the interests of the people involved is not the same in all cases of possible procreation.  The risk of being the child of a teenager is different from the risks of being the child of thirty year olds and is different from the risk of being the child of middle aged or elderly parents. 
	The principle of Procreative Balance is designed to address the interests of the people that are usually most deeply and directly impacted by the procreative act: the prospective parents and the future child.  However, creating a person impacts the interests of many other people as well and can even affect the interests of non-human animals because humans consume considerable natural resources, sometimes thereby depleting natural resources for other non-human animals.  Sometimes, the interests of people other than prospective parents and their future child can be impacted by the parental procreative decision to the point where those considerations can significantly affect the moral permissibility of that procreative act and, in those cases, appeal to Procreative Balance will not give us a complete assessment of the morality of procreating.  But I don't think overpopulation is one of those kinds of cases.  It is not clear to me that overpopulation affects others to the point that all procreativity is wrong because not having any children is a very steep cost to an individual and there are other ways to address overpopulation and the problems associated with it.  While less draconian than a total procreation ban, limiting everyone to a maximum of one child, thereby eliminating sibling relationships and the opportunity to procreate with a new mate (among other things), seems like a rather drastic response to overpopulation, especially since there are more effective and less burdensome ways to reduce population, such as reducing child mortality or improving women's access to education.  (Of course, there may be many reasons to limit procreation in particular cases and the reasons for having additional children, once one has had a child already, generally grow weaker with each child one already has, as I will discuss shortly). For many people, having children is the single most fulfilling and meaningful experience of their lives.  Furthermore, having children is probably a very strong biological instinct (organisms that lack this drive are very likely to die out).  And, while there are certainly many other ways to lead a fulfilling and meaningful life, closing off this avenue of fulfillment and meaning is a very steep price to pay for overpopulation, especially since there are less burdensome ways of curbing population growth.  In fact, one of the most effective ways to limit population growth is to provide women with reliable access to contraception.  Enhancing choice seems like a much less burdensome way to address overpopulation than deeming all procreation morally wrong.  Why should people have to give up on a major part of what they take to be a flourishing and meaningful life just because other people prevent or don't enhance contraception access?  That doesn't seem particularly fair to me.  Coming at consideration of people other than prospective parents and children from the opposite direction, when the interests of others may count in favor of procreation, we may consider cases where creating people will have a positive effect on the interest of people other than the child's parents, e.g. when countries or communities are experiencing severe population decline.  Some see the community of people with Down syndrome as a situation of this type.  My view on these sorts of cases is that it is extremely morally problematic to create a person solely for the benefit of other people, and without due consideration of the interests of the child herself, since that seems to be using the child solely for the good of others, and not respecting the child's moral status as an end in herself, worthy of respect and consideration in her own right.  The interests of the future child, as a separate self, and in her own right, must always be a central consideration when thinking about the morality of creating a person.
To return to the parties whose interests are usually most deeply and directly impacted by the creation of a person, namely, parents and their child, for some people, the answer to "How many children should I have?" is probably none.  "None," is the number of children that psychopaths or sadists should have because they are likely to be terrible parents whose children do not have a decent chance at enjoying a life of human flourishing.  "None" is probably also the number of children that people whose children are likely to starve to death before reaching adulthood should have.  I am using extreme cases here but they serve to make the point that how many children one should have depends on the particulars of the risk imposed in the particular case.  Some people should not have any children.  Other people should not have more than one child.  There can be many reasons for "one" being the answer to how many children a person should have.  Reasons for only having one child can include something as simple as only having the resources to provide adequately for one child or something as complex as noting that once people already have a child, their interest in having additional children weakens because having children or not can be life altering but having two children instead of one, or three instead of two, doesn't have the same impact or significance on people's lives.  (Whether you get the chance to be a parent can be extremely significant and impactful to a person; how many children you have is usually much less significant to a person.  With each additional child, the difference it makes to the parents to have that additional child - two rather than three or three rather than four, etc. – will generally lessen).  If the interest we have in imposing the risk is weaker, then reasons for restricting us from imposing the risk may be comparably stronger since we assess the morality of risk imposition depending on the impact the risk imposing act is likely to have on the interests of those impacted by it.  Still, there are legitimate reasons to desire more than one child and having more than one child may be permissible, depending, once again, on how we assess the interests that the parents have in having another child as compared with the interests the future child has in having an excellent life.  
	We can use the same reasoning to assess whether we should create new children or adopt existing children.  For those who are at high risk of passing on a terrible genetic abnormality to their biological children, adoption might be a way for them to be parents without imposing an unacceptable risk on their children.  It is not uncommon for people to consider adoption a morally laudable alternative to creating new children and some think that we should adopt rather than create children.  But in order to establish that we should adopt rather than create children, we ought to consider the impact that adoption could have on the interests of people impacted by adoption.  Adoption is often thought of as a win-win, great for the child in need of parents and great for prospective parents, interested in raising a child.  Yet it is not necessarily the best we can do for children in need of parents.  It's possible that providing the child's biological parents with the resources necessary to adequately raise their child would be better for the child and her biological parents.  It is also important to note that adoption is not an option available to all prospective parents as it is often a very lengthy, expensive, and exclusionary process.  It is also worth noting that "we should adopt" can't be the answer for everyone because someone has to create the children in order for there to be children for others to adopt.
The fact that there is not one number of children that it is morally optimal or acceptable for people to create doesn't mean that anything goes or that we have no principle upon which to make a decision.  I think we do and I have offered one such principle.  But that principle will not give us one answer to the question regarding the number of children people should create.  It depends.




